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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990901-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

LUIS PENA-FLORES,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of § 76-8-305 and its

requirement that the charged interference or impedance be directed towards a peace
officer that is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention? Questions of statutory
interpretation and questions of law are reviewed for correctness with no deference
afforded to the trial court. State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah App. 1997);
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved in oral
argument at trial (R. 32 at 24-33).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Luis Pena-Flores appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Howard H. Maetani after he was convicted by of Interference with a Peace
Officer, a class B misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Luis Pena-Flores was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court,

American Fork Department, on August 17, 1999, with Interference with a Peace Officer,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 and American
Fork City Ordinance § 76-8-305 (R. 6).
On October 8, 1999, a trial was held before Judge Maetani and Pena-Flores was
convicted of (R. 17-18, 32). At the close of the City's case, Pena-Flores moved to
dismiss the charge on two grounds: One, that Pena-Flores was not interfering with a
lawful arrest or detention of anyone present (R. 32 at 24). Two, that the evidence was
insufficient to establish the Pena-Flores actions impeded the arrest of anyone present (R.
32 at 29). The City responded that Pena-Flores lacks standing 'to contest the arrest or
detention of other persons. He only has standing to contest the arrest or detention of
himself (R. 32 at 25-26). The City also argued that Pena-Flores interfered with his own
2

arrest by his refusal to provide identification (R. 32 at 27). However, Pena-Flores argued
that a refusal to produce identification is insufficient to establish the charged crime (R. 32
at 29-30).
The trial court convicted Pena-Flores under subsection (3) (R. 32 at 32). The trial
court also indicated that whether the officers made a lawful arrest is not the issue rather
the issue is whether Pena-Flores "impeded the officer's performing any act to detain
individuals and to gather information to then effectuate a lawful arrest" (R. 32 at 32-33).
Immediately following the trial, Pena-Flores was ordered to pay a $100.00 fine
and was placed on court probation for twelve months (R. 19-23). On October 12, 1999,
Pena-Flores filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court and this action commenced
(R. 24-25).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Andre Leavitt, a police officer with Provo City, testified that his current
assignment is with the Utah County Task Force on gang activity and narcotics (R. 32 at
4). As part of his duties, Leavitt was in American Fork on July 10, 1999, to assist
American Fork City with their Steel Days carnival in case any fights broke out
particularly involving rival gangs (R. 32 at 4-5). Leavitt testified that they had received
information that a Payson gang may be planning to retaliate against an American Fork
gang (R. 32 at 5-6). The officers were also planning to I.D. "all of the people who were
hanging out with known gang members, who through association could have been" at a
3

fight the previous night at the carnival or at a fight the previous week in Pleasant Grove
(R. 32 at 11-12).
Leavitt testified that approximately ten officers with the task force were present at
the camival (R. 32 at 6). The officers were dressed in black shirts and hats that had
"Police" written on them (Id.). The officers identified gang members from Provo, Payson
and American Fork (R. 32 at 6-7). The officers escorted these gang members from the
back corner of the carnival up to the front (R. 32 at 7-8). The officers had the kids fill
out field interview cards and Leavitt took photographs of them (R. 32 at 8). No illegal
activity had been observed by the officers at the carnival (R. 32 at 23).
While the kids were being detained by the officers, Luis Pena-Flores told them
that they did not have to answer any questions from the officers or allow them to take
their pictures (R. 32 at 8, 20). Leavitt told him to "shut his mouth and to step back out of
the situation" (R. 32 at 9). When other officers "turned around and started to walk up,
take the individual they were dealing with to the front" Pena-Flores "stepped forward
again and started to interfere" (R. 32 at 9).
Leavitt then told Pena-Flores that "he became part of the party and escorted him
up to the front. [I] told him that we were going to interview him now, and I told him he
was coming up to the front of the carnival to be interviewed by me" (R. 32 at 9). Leavitt
then grabbed Pena-Flores by the arm and walked him to the front of the carnival (R. 32 at
19). At the front of the carnival, Leavitt asked Pena-Flores for identification and PenaFlores refused (R. 32 at 9). Leavitt then asked if Pena-Flores had any identification on
4

him and was informed that he had some in his pocket but he reftised to produce it (R. 32
at 9-10). Leavitt then arrested Pena-Flores for interference with a police officer and
failure to provide information (R. 32 at 10). Leavitt then handcuffed Pena-Flores and
physically removed the identification from his pocket (R. 32 at 10).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pena-Flores asserts that the trial court committed legal error in interpreting the
level of encounter between the officers and the gang members and in interpreting the
requirement for a lawful detention or arrest set forth in § 76-8-305. One, Pena-Flores
asserts that the interaction between the police officers and the gang members was a levelone encounter. As such, no one was detained or arrested. Because no one was detained
or arrested, Pena-Flores did not interfere or impede a "lawful arrest or detention" as
required by statute. On the other hand, if the encounter between the police officers and
the gang members was a level-two seizure or detention, then the trial court erred in
finding the detention to be lawful because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
Accordingly, this Court should correct the trial court's errors and reverse Pena-Flores'
conviction for interfering with a peace officer.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT'S INTERPRETATION
OF § 76-8-305 AND ITS REQUIREMENT THAT THE INTERFERENCE
OR IMPEDANCE BE DIRECTED AT A LAWFUL ARREST OR DETENTION
Pena-Flores was convicted by the trial court of interfering with an arresting

r

officer, a class B misdemeanor, under pursuant to American Fork City Ordinance—or
Utah Code Annotated-§ 76-8-305(3). Pena-Flores asserts that his conviction must be
reversed because the trial court erred in it's interpretation of the statute.
The necessary elements for conviction under § 76-8-305(3) are as follows:
1.

Pena-Flores had knowledge, or by reasonable care should have had
knowledge that

I

2.

the police officers were seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention

3.

of himself or another; and

4.

he interfered by refusing to refrain from performing any act that would

-~""~—— impede the arrest or detention.
Pena-Flores asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in its interpretation of
this statute. In particular, Pena-Flores argues that the trial court committed reversible
error in its interpretation of the statute's requirement that the interference or impedance
be directed at a situation where a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or
detention.
6

In convicting Pena-Flores of interference with a peace officer under § 76-8-305(3)
the trial court made the following statement:
In the totality of the circumstance, the Court finds that the City has
met it's burden, and that the defendant did interfere with the peace officer
in making a lawful arrest. Seems to me-or detention. Seems to me the
charge may say, "interference with peace officer making a lawful arrest."
However, it is really pursuant to the statute three is "or detention."
Whether they made a lawful arrest I think may or may not be the
issue, but I don't think that's the issue. The issue here is "or detention,"
and whether he impeded the officer's performing any act to detain
individuals and to gather information to then effectuate a lawful arrest....
The Court finds him guilty as charged
(R. 32 at 32-33). It appears that the trial court convicted Pena-Flores because the
officers' were detaining "known" gang members in order to gather information which
might lead to a lawful arrest and Pena-Flores interfered or impeded that detention. Based
upon the trial court's use of the word "detain" or "detention" it appears that the trial court
was interpreting the officers' actions in regards to the gang members as a "level-two"
encounter. However, based upon the trial court's comments that the officers were really
only gathering information from the gang members, it appears that the trial court actually
found that the interaction between the officers and the gang members was a "level-one"
police-citizen encounter.
7

Utah courts have repeatedly recognized that there are three levels of
"constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and the public":
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
1

seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person

\

has committed or is about to commit a crime; however the 'detention must
1

be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of

1

the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.

State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
879, 881 (Utah App. 1989) and State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987).
"The distinction between a level-one encounter (a purely consensual encounter) and a
level-two encounter (a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion) depends on whether,
through a show of physical force or authority, a person believes his freedom of movement
is restrained." Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1227.
For conviction under § 76-8-305, the interference or impedance must be with a
lawful level-two detention or level-three arrest because one of the elements of the crime
is that "a peace officer must be seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention" of an
individual-or in this case group of individuals. In convicting Pena-Flores, the trial court
found that the purpose of the interaction between the "known" gang members and the
police officers was to gather information which might eventually lead to a lawful arrest.
8

Pena-Flores asserts that based upon these comments, the trial court found that the
encounter between the police and the gang members was a level-one encounter.
Accordingly, because the gang members were not detained (or under arrest) but were
merely participating in a purely consensual encounter, the trial court erred in concluding
that Pena-Flores was interfering or impeding a lawful detention when there was no such
detention. Instead, Pena-Flores was simply affirming to the gang members what they
should have already known or believed—namely that they were jfree to leave and that they
did not have to participate in this purely consensual encounter with the officers.
Therefore, because the officers were not effectuating a detention or arrest, the trial court's
interpretation of the statute is erroneous and this Court should reverse Pena-Flores
conviction.
On the other hand, if the trial court's use of the word "detention" or "detain" in his
finding of culpability is an indication that the gang members were detained, then the trial
court's conclusion that Pena-Flores interference was with a lawful detention is likewise
erroneous and must be corrected by this Court. For conviction under § 76-8-305, the
interference or impedance must be in a situation where a peace officer is "seeking to
effect a lawful arrest or detention" (emphasis added). In other words, the interference
must be in a situation where an officer is engaged in a proper (constitutionally
permissive) level-two detention or level-three arrest.
For a level-two detention or seizure to be constitutionally permissive an officer
must be able to "'point to specific, articulable facts, which together with rational
9

inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the
defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime.'" Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228
(quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, "the
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness." Struhs, 940 P.2d
at 1228 (citation omitted).
Pena-Flores asserts that the specific set of facts which are present here do not give
rise to "reasonable suspicion" and therefore, the trial court's conclusion that Pena-Flores
comments constituted interference with a lawful detention is erroneous and should be
corrected by this Court. Officer Leavitt admitted that neither he nor the other ten officers
that were involved in the detention of the gang members had observed any illegal activity
(R. 32 at 23). The officers were present in case any fights broke out and because they
had received information that there "might be a problem" (R. 32 at 4-5, 24). However, at
the time of the detention no such problem had arisen.
Moreover, Officer Leavitt could point to no specific, articulable facts that any of
the gang members present were involved in the illegal activity—fight—from either the
previous night or the previous week. In fact, Leavitt's testimony establishes only that the
officers were planning to I.D. "all of the people who were hanging out with known gang
members, who through association could have been" at a fight the previous night at the
carnival or at a fight the previous week in Pleasant Grove (R. 32 at 11-12). Pena-Flores
asserts that "could have been" involved in illegal activity is insufficient to establish that
10

any of the detained individuals "had committed or was about to commit a crime." Struhs,
940 P.2d 1228. Accordingly, because the officers lacked articulable suspicion of
criminal activity to detain the gang members, their detention was not lawful and PenaFlores' conviction must be reversed because the trial court dtiaiiiiiialiotis, arc erroneous
and require correction.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Pena-Flores asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the trial court's
statutory interpretation concerning the lawfulness and existence of a constitutionally
permissive detention was in error. Alternatively, Pena-Flores asks that his conviction be
reversed because the trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion was likewise in
error.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i ^ L day of May, 2000.

Margarerr. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to Bruce Murdock, American Fork Cit\ \\u >i nc\, si b Wcsi ivLn.fi
Street, American Fork, Utah 84003 t h i s J ^ W of May, 2000.
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ADDENDA
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i a purpose to interfere with a public servant performjfpoxporting to perform an official function,
i for purposes of this section, "public servant" does not
pjurors.
i»93
Picketing or parading in or near court.
_on is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he pickets or
j in or near a building which houses a court of this state
ntent to obstruct access to that court or to affect the
me of a case pending before that court.
1978
(Vj§3. P r e v e n t i o n of Legislature or public servants
8 f ^ from m e e t i n g or organizing.
f person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he
Ltionally and by force or fraud:
t&»(l) Prevents the Legislature, or either of the houses
i m p o s i n g it, or any of the members thereof, from meeting
Jrorganizing; or
(2) Prevents any other public servant from meeting or
I i^ganizing to perform a lawful governmental function.
1973
in if

| 4 0 4 . Disturbing Legislature or official meeting.
Wji person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he
nationally:
« ^(a) disturbs the Legislature, or either of the houses
t|omposing it, while in session;
* * (b) commits any disorderly conduct in the immediate
*Hew and presence of either house of the Legislature,
finding to interrupt its proceedings or impair the respect
Wits authority; or
(c) disturbs an official meeting or commits any disorilerly conduct in immediate view and presence of particiJjants in an official meeting tending to interrupt its
* Jproceedings.
I) "Official meeting," as used in this section, means any
ifal meeting of public servants for the purposes of carrying
f overnmen tal functions.
l »«2
I 305. Interference w i t h arresting officer.
person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has
j pledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
ledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful
mt or detention of that person or another and interferes
ithe arrest or detention by:
'•* (1) use of force or any weapon;
|- (2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act
quired by lawful order:
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or
detention; or
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to
yrefrain from performing any act that would impede the
>st or detention.
1990
Obstructing justice.
A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder,
it, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution,
bn, or punishment of another for the commission of a
he:
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it
|from a magistrate;
I (b) harbors or conceals the offender;
fc(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation,
|™guise, or other means for avoiding discovery or appre|«nsion;
i t (d) warns the offender of impending discovery or apprehension;
I W conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence
pwat might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or convic«on of the person;

P

(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the person; or
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement officer
has been authorized or has applied for authorization
under either Section 77-23a-10 or 77-23a-15 to intercept a
wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives notice or
attempts to give notice of the possible interception to any
person.
(2) An offense under Subsections (l)(a) through (f) is a class
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that the offender
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree, in
which case the offense is a second degree felony.
(3) An offense under Subsection (l)(g) is a third degree
felony.
(4) Subsection (l)(f) does not apply to an act against a juror.
Obstructing the function of a juror is addressed in Section
76-8-508.5.
(5) The provisions of Section 76-8-316 shall govern an act or
threat against a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons
and Parole or the judge's or member's immediate family. 1995
76-8-307. Failure to aid peace officer.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, upon
command by a peace officer identifiable or identified by him as
such, he unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer
in effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any
offense by another person.
1973
76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent
criminal prosecution — Defense.
(1) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he:
(a) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as
consideration for his refraining from initiating or aiding
in a criminal prosecution; or
(b) confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon
another as consideration for the person refraining from
initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution.
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the benefit
did not exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as
restitution or indemnification for the loss caused or to be
caused by the offense.
_
1991
76-8-309.

Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive sentences — Definitions.
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody
without authorization.
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the
commission of an escape he uses a dangerous weapon or
facsimile thereof, or causes serious bodily injury to another.
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony.
(4) Any other escape is a third degree felony.
(5) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape
under this section shall run consecutively with any other
sentence.
(6) For the purposes of this part:
(a) "Confinement" means:
(i) housed in a state prison after being sentenced
and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial
or sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole;
or
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest.
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or
without warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail,
institution for secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or

